The court first ruled that the question whether a consumer is effectively harmed by the act committed, is irrelevant. Relevant is whether economic interests of consumers could have been harmed.
Next, the court held that the average consumer is indeed well- informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, however determining whether under the concrete circumstances consumers will be misled depends on the circumstances of the case. Due to the lack of experience of the average consumer in the field of energy market and due to using telemarketing (which has an overwhelming influence on consumers), consumers could have taken a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.
The court further held that the plaintiff acted in a very persistent way in approaching consumers. Even when consumers indicated they had no interest in the offer, the plaintiff pushed through to enforce a contractual obligation. This constituted an aggressive commercial practice due to the persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone.
Due to the largeness of the scale of telemarketing used by the plaintiff, the offer was available for consumers without making a distinction between them. By falsely stating that the offer was only available for a limited time or on particular terms, the plaintiff tried to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient time to make an informed choice. This was considered to be unfair.
The distinction made by plaintiff between electricity and gas was not explicitly communicated to consumers. Therefore, so the court held, it was unclear that they would be confronted with price increases after all. Such information had to be communicated in a transparent and clear manner so that they were able to make a well-informed transactional decision. This constituted a misleading commercial practice.
Although the information provided was misleading, this was not considered to be a commercial practice that falls within the scope of comparative advertising. Therefore, the court ruled that there was no violation of the Dutch implementation of article 6, 2 (a) of the Directive.
According to the court, the practice of asking consumers' permission for direct debit on the pretense that consumer’s details had to be checked, while in reality the reason was to actually use this permission for direct debit of the monthly payments, was contrary to the requirements of professional diligence since it materially distorts or was likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the offer of the average consumer